

SECRET
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable


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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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151822Z

CITE

DIST 15 DECEMBER 1967

COUNTRY GREECE

DOI 13 TO 14 DECEMBER 1967.

SUBJECT REGIME ATTITUDE TOWARD FOREIGN POWERS

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ

SOURCE

1.5(c)(d)
3.4(b)(1)(6)

1.

DIRECTOR

AND HIS ASSISTANT,

VOICED SUSPICIONS

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

JUNE 1999

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~
(classification)

THAT KING KONSTANTINOS' COUNTER-COUP ATTEMPT HAD THE "STRONG SUPPORT OF THE BRITISH AND THE QUIET ACQUIESCENCE OF THE AMERICANS." BOTH STATED THAT NOW THAT THE REGIME IS IN FIRM CONTROL OF THE MILITARY AND THE KING HAS DEPARTED, GREECE SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO DEPEND ON HER ALLIES AS IN THE PAST; IN FACT, GREECE SHOULD FOLLOW AN "INDEPENDENT" POLICY, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE BAD TREATMENT OF THE JUNTA BY THE ALLIES SINCE 21 APRIL.

DESCRIBED THIS INDEPENDENT POLICY AS ONE WHICH WOULD TAKE GREECE OUT OF NATO BY 1969, WHICH WOULD DEVELOP IN MANY

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

WAYS LIKE DE GAULLE'S FOREIGN POLICY (ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE ALIGNED WITH IT) AND WOULD INCLUDE AN INCREASE IN ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, WITH WHICH GREECE HAS TRADED ON FAVORABLE TERMS IN THE PAST. IN

SUMMATION, STATED THAT SINCE 21 APRIL THE JUNTA SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT GREECE HAS BEEN ABLE TO LIVE WITHOUT SUPPORT FROM THE ALLIES; CONSEQUENTLY GREECE DOES NOT NEED THE ALLIES. "IF THE ALLIES NEED US FINE; IF NOT, THEY WILL GO THEIR WAY AND WE WILL GO OURS."

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2. DURING THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE KING'S COUNTER-COUP

PRIME MINISTER COLONEL GEORGIOS PAPADOPOULOS

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)~~S-E-C-R-E-T~~

S-E-C-R-E-T

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

COMMENTED ON SEVERAL OCCASSIONS THAT THE AMERICANS
PROBABLY WERE SUPPORTING THE COUNTER-COUP. [REDACTED]

THESE STATEMENTS WERE MADE BEFORE PAPADOPOULOS MET WITH UNITED
STATES AMBASSADOR PHILLIPS TALBOT ABOUT NOON ON 13 DECEMBER.)
AT APPROXIMATELY 1330 HOURS ON 13 DECEMBER PAPADOPOULOS STATED
THAT THE KING'S COUNTER-COUP "WAS SET UP BY THE CIA IN ATHENS".

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] THIS STATEMENT WAS MADE AFTER THE MEETING
BETWEEN APADOPOULOS AND THE AMBASSADOR.) DURING THE PERIOD OF
13 TO 14 DECEMBER, PAPADOPOULOS GRADUALLY BECAME CONVINCED THAT
THE AMERICANS WERE NOT ACTIVELY SUPPORTING THE COUNTER-COUP;
HOWEVER, PAPADOPOULOS CONTINUED TO BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICANS
HAD BEEN AT LEAST FOREWARNED AND HAD QUIETLY "APPROVED IT".
DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 14 DECEMBER, WHEN IT HAD
BECOME ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT THE KING COULD NOT MUSTER ANY
SUPPORT FOR HIS MOVEMENT IN THE MILITARY, PAPADOPOULOS EXPRESSED
CONCERN AS TO THE FUTURE RECOGNITION OF THE GREEK GOVERNMENT
BY FOREIGN POWERS. SPECIFICALLY, PAPADOPOULOS EXPRESSED FEAR
THAT THE ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, MIGHT NOT
RECOGNIZE THE JUNTA AS THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF GREECE. AS THE
DAY OF 14 DECEMBER PROGRESSED, VARIOUS JUNTA OFFICERS, ESPECIALLY
S-E-C-R-E-T [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

• S-E-R-E-T [REDACTED]
(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

THE EXTREMISTS, BEGAN ADVISING PAPADOPOULOS THAT HE MUST NOT "SURRENDER TO THE ALLIES IN ORDER TO GAIN RECOGNITION", POINTING OUT TO PAPADOPOULOS THAT THE ALLIES, AND PARTICULARLY THE UNITED STATES, NEED GREECE NOW IF NATO IS TO BE MAINTAINED AND IF GREEK NEUTRALISM IS TO BE PREVENTED. ALTHOUGH INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE IS DESIRABLE, IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE REGIME'S INTERNAL SURVIVAL. FURTHERMORE, GREECE COULD FIND "COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD ACCEPT HER". PAPADOPOULOS HAS RESISTED EFFORTS BY THE EXTREMISTS TO TAKE A HARD STAND TOWARD THE KING AND THE AMERICANS THROUGH THE GREEK PRESS. PAPADOPOULOS STATED THAT ONE OF THE EXCESSES OF THE 21 APRIL REGIME WAS ITS OVER-REACTION TO MANY PROBLEMS, AND HE DID NOT WANT THE JUNTA TO MAKE THE SAME MISTAKE NOW. PAPADOPOULOS EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD RECOGNIZE THE JUNTA AS THE LEGAL GOVERNMENT OF GREECE SIMPLY BECAUSE IT WAS REALISTIC TO DO SO. HE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT WANT TO ABANDON ITS HEAVY INVESTMENT IN GREECE AND TO ENDANGER THE NATO ALLIANCE FURTHER.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] DESPITE THIS EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE, PAPADOPOULOS IS DEFINITELY WORRIED ABOUT FOREIGN, AND ESPECIALLY UNITED STATES, RECOGNITION.)

S-E-R-E-T [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

S-E-C-R-E-T

(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)

3. [REDACTED] DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCSOUTH

(PERSONAL) CINCUSNAVEUR CINCMEAFSA USAREUR USAFE [REDACTED]

GP-1

REPORT CLASS SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

1.5(c)

3.4(b)(1)